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ABSTRACT." The theory of formal disciplinenthat is, 
the view that instruction in abstract rule systems can affect 
reasoning about everyday-life eventsnhas been rejected 
by 20th century psychologists on the basis of rather scant 
evidence. We examined the effects of  graduate training in 
law, medicine, psychology, and chemistry on statistical 
reasoning, methodological reasoning about confounded 
variables, and reasoning about problems in the logic of  
the conditional Both psychology and medical training 
produced large effects on statistical and methodological 
reasoning, and psychology, medical, and law training pro- 
duced effects on ability to reason about problems in the 
logic of  the conditional Chemistry training had no effect 
on any type of  reasoning studied. These results seem well 
understood in terms of  the rule systems taught by the 
various fields and indicate that a version of  the formal 
discipline hypothesis is correct. 
A few years ago an article appeared on the Op-Ed page 
of The New York Times urging that Latin and Greek be 
taught routinely to high school students in order to im- 
prove intelligence (Costa, 1982). The justification given 
for this recommendation was a study showing that stu- 
dents who had taken Latin and Greek in high school 
scored 100 points higher on the verbal portion of the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) than students who had 
not studied these languages. 
Although the editors of The New York Times ap- 
parently thought that this argument was worthy of con- 
sideration by its readers, it seems likely that most aca- 
demically trained psychologists would be dubious on two 
different grounds. First, because of their methodological 
training, psychologists would be aware of the likelihood 
of substantial self-selection effects in any study of the kind 
described: High school students who take Latin and Greek 
are likely to be more intelligent than students who do 
not, and schools that include Latin and Greek in their 
curriculums are likely to have higher academic standards 
than schools that do not. Second, most psychologists are 
aware of the bad reputation of the "learning Latin" ap- 
proach to teaching reasoning. Thus, they believe reason- 
ing cannot be taught by teaching the syntax of a foreign 
language, by teaching principles of mathematics, or in- 
deed by any "formal discipline" procedure whereby the 
rules of some field are taught and then are expected to 
be generalized outside the bounds of the problems in that 
field9 
Psychologists are, no doubt, right in their assertion 
that self-selection undercuts the argument for teaching 
Latin and Greek9 Are they equally justified, though, in 
assuming that teaching foreign languages or any other 
formal discipline has no generalized implications for rea- 
soning? The antiformal discipline view not only conflicts 
with what people have believed for most of recorded his- 
tory, but its scientific support is far less substantial than 
most psychologists realize. 
The ancient Greeks believed that the study of math- 
ematics improved reasoning. Plato urged the "principal 
men of the state" to study arithmetic. He believed that 
"even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training 
9 . . always become much quicker than they would oth- 
erwise have been" (quoted in Jowett, 1937, p. 785). Ro- 
man thinkers agreed with the Greeks about the value of 
arithmetic and also endorsed the study of grammar as a 
useful discipline for improving reasoning. The medieval 
scholastics added logic, especially the study of syllogisms, 
to the list of disciplines that could formally train the mind. 
The humanists added the study of Latin and Greek, and 
the curriculum for European education was set for the 
next several hundred years (Mann, 1979). 
The 20th Century Critique of Formal 
Discipline 
Although there were objections to the standard curricu- 
lum as early as the Enlightenment on the grounds that 
the rules of mathematics and Latin bear little actual re- 
semblance to the rules necessary to think about most 
everyday-life events, it was not until the late 19th century 
that the view came under concerted attack9 The attack 
came from psychologists, and it was utterly effective. In 
fact, it was one of the first policy victories of the new field. 
William James was withering in his critique of "faculty 
psychology," that is, of the view that mental abilities con- 
sisted of faculties such as memory, reasoning, and will 
that could be improved by mere exercise in the way that 
muscles could9 Thorndike (1906, 1913) undertook a pro- 
gram of research, still impressive by modern standards, 
that showed little transfer of training across tasks, for ex- 
ample, from canceling letters to canceling parts of speech 
or from estimating areas of rectangles of one size and 
shape to estimating areas of rectangles of another size 
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and shape. Thorndike declared that "training the mind 
means the development of thousands of particular inde- 
pendent capacities" (Thorndike, 1906, p. 246). Hence, 
training in Latin could not be expected to improve peo- 
ple's capacities to perform other very different mental 
tasks. 
Similar conclusions have been reached by contem- 
porary psychologists investigating the transfer of solutions 
of one problem to solutions of another formally identical 
problem, for example, between isomorphs of the "Tower 
of Hanoi" problem (Hayes & Simon, 1977), between 
homomorphs of the missionaries and cannibals problem 
(Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974), and between slightly 
transformed versions of algebra problems (Reed, Demp- 
ster, & Ettinger, 1985). Learning how to solve one problem 
produces no improvement in solving others having an 
identical formal structure. 
The most influential student of reasoning in the 
middle of the 20th century, Piaget, reinforced already 
skeptical views of the value of formal training. Piaget be- 
lieved that there were general rules underlying reason- 
i n g - t h e  formal operations and the propositional oper- 
a t i o n s - b u t  that these abstract rules were induced by ev- 
eryone by virtue of living in the world with its particular 
regularities (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958). Because 
learning is mainly by induction, via methods of self-dis- 
covery, formal training can do little to extend it or even 
to speed it up. It is important to note, however, that little 
research seems to have been conducted examining Pia- 
get's dictum that abstract rules are difficult to teach. 
A still more radical view than Piaget's has emerged 
as a result of studying people's ability to perform certain 
logical operations. Wason (1966) and other investigators 
have established that people have great difficulty with ab- 
stract problems that follow the form of the material con- 
ditional, i fp  then q. This has been done by examining 
how people respond to selection tasks that embody this 
logic. For example, subjects are shown four cards dis- 
playing an A, a B, a 4, and a 7; are told that all cards 
have letters on the front and numbers on the back; and 
are asked to turn over as many as necessary to establish 
whether it is the case that " i f  there is a vowel on the front, 
then there is an even number on the back." Few subjects 
reach the correct conclusion that it is necessary to turn 
over the A (because if there were not an even number on 
the back, the rule would be violated) and the 7 (because 
if there were a vowel on the front, the rule would be vi- 
olated). More generally, to determine the truth of a con- 
ditional statement, the cases that must be checked are p 
(because if p is the case, it must be established that q is 
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also the case) and not-q (because if it is not the case that 
q, it must be established that it is also not the case 
that p). 
Yet subjects have no difficulty solving familiar ev- 
eryday-life problems formally identical to the Wason se- 
lection task. For example, when asked to turn over as 
many sales receipts as necessary to establish that " i f  the 
receipt is for more than $20, it has a signature on the 
back," subjects readily understand that large amounts 
and unsigned reverses have to be checked (D'Andrade, 
1982). This fact has led some theorists to argue that people 
do not use inferential rules at all, but rather they use only 
those rules that are at a concrete, empirical level (e.g., 
D'Andrade, 1982; Griggs & Cox, 1982; Manktelow & 
Evans, 1979). This view would be consistent with the 
most extreme position derivable from Thorndike's find- 
ings: Learning does not transfer from task to task, and 
subjects do not generalize from a set of tasks to the level 
of abstract rules. 
Pragmatic Inferential Rules 
Recently, we and our colleagues have argued that the 
Thorndike tradition is mistaken in asserting the extreme 
domain specificity of all rule learning. We have identified 
several naturally occurring inferential rules that people 
use to solve everyday-life problems and have found that 
they are improvable by purely formal training (Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; 
Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Holland, Holyoak, Nis- 
bett, & Thagard, 1986; Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 
1987). These "pragmatic inferential rules" capture re- 
curring regularities among problem goals and among 
event relationships that people encounter in everyday life. 
They are fully abstract in that they are not tied to any 
content domain (much like Piaget's formal operations), 
but they are not as independent of relationship types and 
problem goals as formal logical rules (which are included 
in Piaget's propositional operations) or the purely syn- 
tactic rule systems often studied by modern cognitive 
psychologists. 
Contractual Schemas 
One type of pragmatic inferential rule system we have 
studied we call "contractual schemas." These schemas 
represent situations in which a permission is required to 
perform some action or in which an obligation is incurred 
by virtue of the occurrence of some event. These schemas 
are of particular interest because the procedures needed 
to establish whether a permission or obligation has been 
violated are the same as the checking procedures required 
by the conditional to establish whether a proposition of 
the form "if  p, then q" obtains. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) showed that the schema 
for permissions is useful in performing selection tasks 
having the form of the Wason card problem. In one of 
Cheng and Holyoak's experiments, subjects were pre- 
sented with a selection problem based on an abstract de- 
scription of a permission situation: " I f  one is to take action 
'A,' then one must first satisfy precondition 'P.' "Abou t  
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60% of the subjects solved this problem as compared with 
20% who solved the original Wason selection task. Cheng 
and Holyoak also found that providing an explicit purpose 
for a rule that would otherwise seem arbitrary could serve 
to cue the permission schema and hence facilitate per- 
formance. These findings are incompatible with the ex- 
treme domain specificity view stemming from Thorn- 
dike's position. The findings also indicate that the selec- 
tion task, with its arbitrary elements and relations, is 
difficult because people normally reason using schemas 
of the permission type rather than the rules of formal 
logic. When reasoning schemas are invoked, people can 
solve problems that are formally identical to the card 
selection task because the schematic rule structures are 
identical. 
It also turns out to be the case that training in formal 
logic has little effect on people's ability to solve either 
arbitrary or semantically meaningful versions of the se- 
lection task, whereas training in the obligation schema 
has a substantial effect. Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and 
Oliver (I 986) found that neither an intensive training ses- 
sion on the nature of conditional rules nor even an entire 
course in logic improved subjects' performance. In con- 
trast, Cheng et al. found that even brief instruction in the 
obligation schema improved subjects' abilities to solve 
the selection task, especially more semantically mean- 
ingful versions of it that could be understood in terms of 
the obligation notion. 
Causal Schemas 
Cheng, Nisbett, and Oliver (1987) have argued that an- 
other type of pragmatic reasoning schema, namely causal 
schemas of the kind defined by Kelley (1971, 1973), may 
also help people to solve problems that are syntactically 
identical to the selection problem. Kelley argued that 
people understand the ideas of necessariness and suffi- 
ciency in causality and possess different schemas for 
checking evidence supporting causal hypotheses that are 
necessary and sufficient, necessary but not sufficient, and 
so on. Cheng et al. (1987) found support for this view. 
They found that subjects tacitly assumed a particular type 
of causality and then applied evidence-checking proce- 
dures appropriate to the type. Interestingly, one of the 
schemas, namely that for sufficient but not necessary 
causes, has checking procedures identical to that for the 
conditional selection task. A hypothesis of the type "A 
among other things always causes effect B" can be dis- 
proved by examining A and finding that not-B was the 
case, or examining not-B and finding that A was the case. 
Cheng et al. (1986) found that subjects performed better 
on selection tasks that had a causal interpretation that 
might encourage subjects to use the same checking pro- 
cedures as required by the conditional. The checking 
procedures for the necessary and sufficient type of cau- 
sality, as it happens, are the same as for the biconditional 
(p if  and only if  q) in formal logic. The biconditional 
requires examining all four cases--p, not-p, q, and not- 
q. The other two causal schemas--namely, necessary but 
not sufficient, and neither necessary nor sufficient--also 
have distinct checking procedures associated with them. 
The social sciences, it should be noted, have developed 
elaborate methodologies for dealing with the completely 
probabilistic type of causality characterized by the neither 
necessary nor sufficient type. 
Statistical Rules 
Another of the inferential rules we have studied is com- 
parable to Piaget's "probability schema." In our view, 
this is not a single schema but a family of related schemas 
or heuristics having to do with the law of large numbers; 
the rule that sample values resemble population values 
as a direct function of sample size and an inverse function 
of population variability; and the related regression or 
base rate principles, for example, the rule that extreme 
values for an object or sample are less likely to be extreme 
when the object is reexamined or a new sample observed. 
We have found that people often use the law of large 
numbers and relatively simple applications of the regres- 
sion principle when solving problems in everyday life 
(Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). We have also 
found that people's solutions of everyday-life problems 
using statistical rules are greatly enhanced not only by 
instruction in college statistics courses but even by rela- 
tively brief training sessions (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 
1986). These training sessions are effective even when the 
training is highly abstract and formal and does not make 
any reference to everyday-life content. In addition, train- 
ing in one domain of events improves reasoning for other 
quite different domains fully as much as for the trained 
domain, suggesting that subjects readily abstract what they 
learn from a given domain (Fong et al., 1986; Fong & 
Nisbett, 1988). 
Graduate School and Formal Discipline 
The work done to date indicates that people reason using 
inferential rules at a fairly high level of abstraction and 
that their ability to use such rules can be improved by 
formal training procedures. Theorists prior to the 20th 
century thus were probably correct about the basic notion 
of formal discipline, although they probably misidentified 
the particular types of rule systems that are amenable to 
training and that allow substantial generalization to ev- 
eryday-life problems. The syntactic rule systems of 
mathematics and formal logic may be destined to play 
little role in everyday reasoning even when these have 
been well-taught; pragmatic rule systems, such as the law 
of large numbers, causal schemas, and contractual sche- 
mas, may play a significant role even prior to formal 
training. 
The work also has some clear implications for un- 
derstanding the effects of education on the way people' 
reason. Because graduate training in particular is highly 
specialized with respect to the inferential rules empha- 
sized, the possibility exists that different kinds of graduate 
trairdng produce different effects on reasoning about var- 
Ious everyday-life events. In particular, we would expect 
that scientific disciplines teach different rules than non- 
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scientific disciplines and that there might be differences 
within the sciences themselves having to do with whether 
the field is at base probabilistic or deterministic. We stud- 
ied two probabilistic sciences, namely psychology and 
medicine, a nonprobabilistic or deterministic science, 
namely chemistry, and a nonscience, namely law. 
One would expect that training in the probabilistic 
sciences would affect statistical reasoning, sensitizing 
people, for example, to the riskiness of inferences from 
small samples. One would also expect such training to 
affect causal reasoning because accurate causal judgments 
usually require some understanding of the problems posed 
by confounded variables, the bane of the probabilistic 
sciences. A methodological education in the probabilistic 
sciences sensitizes people to problems that arise when 
studying causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient. 
It includes rules about when and how to employ control 
groups, how to avoid sample bias, and how to recognize 
and avoid the errors that can arise when subjects who are 
selected or who select themselves for a treatment on the 
basis of one variable also differ on other variables that 
are potentially correlated with the dependent variable of 
interest. In contrast, one might expect that training in a 
nonprobabilistic science such as chemistry would have 
less effect on statistical reasoning and on methodological 
reasoning, which requires sensitivity toward the problems 
posed by confounded variables. One might also expect 
training in a nonscience such as the law to have relatively 
little effect on such kinds of reasoning. 
The probabilistic sciences might be expected to im- 
prove reasoning on conditional and biconditional prob- 
lems because these fields distinguish the nature of cau- 
sality implied by their hypotheses, often in a quite self- 
conscious fashion. Most hypotheses examined by social 
scientists are of the neither necessary nor sufficient type. 
Some hypotheses are of the necessary but not sufficient 
kind (for example, that only certain kinds of subjects are 
"at risk" for certain outcomes, although other causes are 
required for the risk to be manifest). Other hypotheses 
are of the sufficient but not necessary kind (that is, many 
different causes may produce a given effect, for example, 
retardation, although none is required). To the extent that 
people use these schemas to solve problems for which a 
logician would use the conditional, we might expect that 
training in the probabilistic sciences would improve con- 
ditional reasoning. Again, one might expect training in 
a nonprobabilistic science such as chemistry to affect such 
reasoning less because it focuses primarily on determin- 
istic causality of the necessary and sufficient kind. 
We might also expect that training in the law would 
improve conditional reasoning. The law deals with con- 
tractual relations that have the form of the conditional 
such as permissions and obligations as well as with con- 
tractual obligations that have the form of the bicondi- 
tional, that is, agreements that a certain action may be 
taken if and only if some event has occurred. 
We investigated the effects of different types of grad- 
uate education on answers to problems that we thought 
would be differentially affected by training. As a control, 
we examined the effects of different training on verbal 
reasoning of the kind tested by the Graduate Record Ex- 
amination (GRE). Verbal reasoning ability increases 
steadily during the young adult years for those involved 
in mentally challenging work (Share, 1979). We expected 
that subjects in all four disciplines would improve slightly, 
and to about the same extent, in verbal reasoning. 
The first study was cross-sectional, examining first- 
and third-year students enrolled at the University of 
Michigan in the fall semester of 1983. The second study 
was a longitudinal one that reexamined the first-year stu- 
dents in the cross-sectional sample at the beginning of 
their third year. 
Study 1: Cross-Sectional Design 
Subjects 
Subjects were first- and third-year graduate students in 
law, medicine, psychology, and chemistry at the University 
of Michigan. Because of substantial attrition in the rel- 
atively small chemistry program, the "third-year" chem- 
istry group also included all available fourth-year students. 
Many educational studies suffer low response rates 
or high drop-out rates, raising the possibility that any 
effects reflect selection biases rather than educational ef- 
fects of interest. The present investigation, except for the 
chemistry group, suffers very little from these problems. 
Almost all the enrolled students in the four programs 
responded, and the drop-out rates were extremely low in 
all programs but chemistry. Moreover, as will be seen 
later, the results for chemistry suggest that the drop-out 
rate for that group does not pose serious problems for 
interpretation. 
The first year response rates were as follows: 213 of 
241 law students (88%), 127 of 133 medical students 
(96%), I 25 of 27 psychology students (93%), and 31 of 32 
chemistry students (97%). 2 
Due to the different numbers of students in the four 
disciplines and the cost of sampling third-year students, 
random samples of 60 third-year law students and 55 
third-year medical students were contacted. Samples were 
based on the populations initially enrolled, so that some 
of the sampled students had dropped out by the time the 
study began. All third-year psychology students and third- 
and fourth-year chemistry students were sampled because 
these programs were relatively small. The third-year re- 
sponse rates were as follows: 50 of 60 ever-enrolled law 
students (83%, but the figure for currently enrolled stu- 
dents was 89%), 48 of 55 ever-enrolled medical students 
(87%), 33 of 36 ever-enrolled psychology students (94%), 
and 26 of 52 ever-enrolled chemistry students (50%, but 
the figure for currently enrolled students was 93%). 
An additional 62 first-year medical students were given a different 
test for the purposes of another study. The total class N was 195. 
2 Students with English language problems were omitted throughout. 
This exclusion procedure significantly affected only the chemistry sam- 
ples. Approximately 18% of chemistry students were excluded as com- 
pared to fewer than 3% of those in the other three disciplines. 
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Procedure 
First-year subjects were given a reasoning test during sep- 
arate mass orientation meetings at the beginning of their 
first term in graduate school. Third-year subjects were 
given the test in one of three settings: group administra- 
tions in their home department, in their own offices, or 
in offices at the Institute for Social Research. In all set- 
tings, a relaxed, unhurried atmosphere prevailed. Subjects 
were instructed to take as much time as necessary to solve 
each problem: "Please treat each fully; but there is no 
need to puzzle unduly over any problem. While some 
questions have right and wrong answers, others do not." 
Two forms of the reasoning test were developed so 
that pre- and posttest versions would be available for the 
longitudinal study. Approximately half of the subjects in 
each group filled out Form 1 of the reasoning test, and 
the other half filled out Form 2. The test took between 
40 and 60 minutes to complete. The third-year students 
were paid $10 for their participation. 
Instrument 
The reasoning test consisted of four sets of questions, 
spread evenly throughout the test booklet. One set was 
intended to measure statistical reasoning; one was in- 
tended to measure confounded variable (or methodolog- 
ical) reasoning; one was intended to measure reasoning 
about problems to which conditional logic could be ap- 
plied; and one was a standard measure of verbal reasoning 
of the kind employed in the Graduate Record Exami- 
nation verbal test. 
Statistical reasoning. The statistical reasoning items 
were intended to measure the subjects' abilities to apply 
the law of large numbers and the regression or base rate 
principle to both scientific problems and everyday-life 
problems. Scientific problems were those that specifically 
mentioned a study of some kind within the body of the 
question, whereas everyday-life problems did not. In one 
of the scientific problems, for example, subjects were told 
about a teaching experiment using high school students. 
They were asked what would be expected to happen to 
the grades of students in a control condition who had 
relatively high grades and those who had relatively low 
grades. A recognition of the regression principle was 
shown by indicating that the high group could be expected 
to have lower grades in the subsequent term and the low 
group could be expected to have higher grades. An ev- 
eryday-life problem to which the law of large numbers 
could be applied was identical to one used by Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983): A high school student 
had to choose between two colleges. The student had sev- 
eral friends, who were similar to himself in values and 
abilities, at each school. All of his friends at school A 
liked it on both educational and social grounds; all of 
them at school B had deep reservations on both grounds. 
The student visited both schools for a day, and his 
impressions were the reverse. Subjects could indicate their 
understanding of the law of large numbers by stating that 
the student should probably choose A because his "one- 
day visit can't give him a very good idea of what the 
school is like, whereas his friends' long-term experience 
can be informative." An example of an everyday-life 
problem to which the regression principle (and perhaps 
the law of large numbers as well) could be applied is pre- 
sented in its entirety in Appendix A at the end of this 
article. 
Methodological reasoning. The methodological 
problems were intended to measure ability to apply var- 
ious confounded-variable principles to problems having 
both scientific content and everyday-life content. One of 
the scientific content problems, for example, presented 
an assertion that the bald eagle population was on the 
rise based on the fact that a study showed that sightings 
of bald eagles by the North American Wildlife Federa- 
tion's annual watch had increased by 35%. An ability to 
apply control group concepts was indicated by recognizing 
that increased sightings of other kinds of birds would un- 
dermine the claim (because it would suggest more people 
involved in the watch, different reporting methods, etc.). 
Another of the scientific problems presented the claim 
that students who learned Latin or Greek got higher SAT 
verbal scores and measured subjects' recognition of the 
self-selection principle. One of the everyday-life content 
methodological problems, showing recognition of the 
need for control groups, is presented in Appendix A. 
Conditional reasoning. Each form contained three 
problems that could be solved by application of the con- 
ditional and one that could be solved by application of 
the biconditional. The problems were those used by Cheng 
et al. (1986). One of the conditional problems was arbi- 
trary (for one of the forms, the Wason card selection 
problem was used), one was couched in language that 
was expected to encourage causal reasoning, and one was 
couched in language that was expected to encourage ap- 
plication of the permission schema. An example of a per- 
mission-schema version of the conditional problem is 
presented in Appendix A. The biconditional problem was 
an assessment of the necessary-and-sufficient checking 
procedure. 
Verbal reasoning. A fourth set of questions was in- 
tended to measure general verbal abilities to recognize 
arguments, evaluate evidence, and detect analogies. These 
items were similar to GRE verbal exam items taken by 
psychology and chemistry students, and to verbal exam 
items on the LSAT (taken by law students) and the MCAT 
(taken by medical students). Many items were in fact 
drawn from practice materials for these verbal exams. An 
example of a verbal reasoning question is presented in 
Appendix A. 
Scale Construction 
Seven items were answered correctly by 90% or more of 
first-year students in one or more of the disciplines. In 
order to prevent ceiling-effect problems, all such items 
were dropped. One additional item was dropped because 
it correlated negatively with total score, that is, the sum 
of all items on the test minus the item itself. 
Individual statistical reasoning items, as it turned 
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out, were no more highly correlated with the sum of other 
statistical items than with the sum of methodological rea- 
soning items, nor were individual methodological items 
correlated more highly with the sum of  other method- 
ological items than with the sum of statistical items. These 
results, together with the fact that the two scales behaved 
very similarly for each discipline for both the cross-sec- 
tional and longitudinal designs, led us to collapse them 
into a single scale. All but two items on this scale were 
correlated more highly with the total statistical-meth- 
odological reasoning score than with either the conditional 
reasoning scale or the verbal reasoning scale. 3 All the 
conditional reasoning items correlated more highly with 
the conditional reasoning total (minus each i tem itself) 
than with either the statistical-methodological total or 
the verbal total. 
Study 2: Longitudinal Design 
A second study was identical in every respect to the first 
except that it had a longitudinal design. First-year students 
were retested at the beginning of their third year of  study. 
All first-year psychology students and chemistry students 
from the cross-sectional study were asked to be retested. 
Stratified random samples were drawn of  the first-year 
medical and law students originally tested, with the stra- 
tification being based on total scores on the initial test. 
Only the sampled students were contacted and asked to 
be retested. Students initially given Form l were given 
Form 2 on the retest and vice versa. Response rates were 
as follows: 77 of the 88 randomly selected law students 
(88%), 87 of  the 91 randomly selected medical students 
(96%), 24 of  the 25 initially tested psychology students 
(96%), and 18 of the 31 initially tested chemistry students 
(58%, but 100% of the 18 still enrolled). 
Students were tested under the same circumstances 
as third-year students in the cross-sectional study and were 
paid $20 for their participation. 4 
Normative Questions About Statistical- 
Methodological Items 
We have sometimes been asked how it is we know that 
the answers we endorse for the statistical and method- 
ological questions are the "correct"  ones. It would be 
3Of the two exceptions, one correlated .12 with the statistical- 
methodological total (minus itself) and. 18 with the conditional total, 
and the other correlated .09 with the statistical-methodological total 
and. 12 with the conditional total. Because the manifest content of these 
items was so similar to the other statistical-methodological items, we 
decided to treat these small discrepancies as measurement error and to 
leave the items on the statistical-methodological scale. 
4 A separate study was done of the effect of retesting on scores on 
each of the subscales. The study included 129 medical students, none 
of whom had participated in either Study 1 or Study 2. The two test 
administrations were approximately six weeks apart. The group posttest 
score was not higher than the group pretest score for any of the three 
reasoning suhtests of interest. A similar "retest" study was done with 
approximately 80 law students with identical results. These findings mean 
that any changes registered for the longitudinal study are due to something 
associated with two years of education in the respective disciplines rather 
than with the effect of retesting per se. 
possible for us to say simply that we are reporting changes 
and that others may decide whether these changes are for 
the better. Undoubtedly, others will decide for themselves, 
regardless of what we say, but we have a normative stance, 
which applies to the verbal and conditional questions as 
well, that readers may wish to consider. 
Generally speaking, the position that testers take on 
the question of how to identify "right answers" is that an 
answer endorsed by a consensus of  experts is the correct 
one. In some cases, this presumption is based on actual 
polling of experts, but in most  cases it is based on an 
assumed ability to mimic the stance of  experts toward 
test items. We subscribe to this position. 
In the present case, we have discussed many  of our 
statistical and methodological items with experts in sta- 
tistical and methodological reasoning, in several instances 
at conferences of  experts in inductive reasoning, including 
statisticians as well as epistemologists and cognitive psy- 
chologists with substantial statistical expertise. For each 
of these items, the overwhelming consensus of  the experts 
is that the answer we prefer is the correct one. The other 
items we used resemble those items to a considerable 
degree. 
Our  judgments in these respects are supported by 
some empirical data. First, it turns out that people who 
endorse the statistical answers we prefer for questions of  
the present type are more likely to endorse parallel an- 
swers for quite noncontroversial statistical questions in- 
volving the behavior of  randomizing devices (Jepson, 
Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983). In addition, people who endorse 
the answers we prefer receive generally higher scores on 
intelligence tests than do those who do not. Indeed, a 
subtest of  statistical items correlates about  as well with 
combined verbal and mathematical  ability as measured 
by the SAT as do some standard IQ subtests such as spatial 
reasoning and analogies (Jepson et al., 1983). In the pres- 
ent study, all of  our subtest scores were positively corre- 
lated both with full test scores and with the admissions 
test score, which was the total G R E  score (math plus 
verbal plus analytic test scores) in the case of  psychology 
and chemistry students, the total MCAT in the case of  
medical students, and the LSAT in the case of  law stu- 
dents. Thus, our preferences are in line both with those 
of  experts and with those students in each discipline scor- 
ing highest on traditional ability tests. 
Results 
Cohort Differences 
In order to determine whether there were any cohort dif- 
ferences in general ability, we compared  the admission 
test scores of  first-year students and third-year students 
within each discipline. The combined G R E  score was 
used for psychology and chemistry students, the combined 
MCAT for medical students, and the LSAT for law stu- 
dents. There were no differences between first- and third- 
year students of  even marginal significance for any dis- 
cipline. 
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Initial Differences 
The first-year students differed marginally by discipline 
in their initial scores on the conditional reasoning test, 
F(3, 395) = 2.2, p = .08. 5 This was due to the law students 
scoring slightly higher and the medical students slightly 
lower than the other two groups. The first-year students 
differed substantially in both statistical-methodological 
and verbal reasoning, F(3, 395) = 6.9, p < .0002, F(3, 
395) = 2.93, p < .03, respectively. These latter two dif- 
ferences were due almost entirely to the relatively low 
scores of chemistry students (though there was also a slight 
elevation of law student scores over the scores of others 
on verbal reasoning). As might be expected, it was dis- 
proportionately the low-scoring chemistry students who 
subsequently left the program. The combined GRE 
scores for chemistry students who left the program (M = 
1,676) was also lower than for those who remained 
(M = 1,880), t(40) = 39.18, p < .01. As a consequence, 
when only those first-year students who were included in 
the longitudinal sample were examined, a different pattern 
emerged. There were no disciplinary differences in the 
first-year scores of those in the longitudinal sample in 
either statistical-methodological reasoning, F(3, 205) = 
1.78, p = .  15 or conditional reasoning, F(3, 205) = .31, 
p = .82. There remained a slight difference in verbal rea- 
soning for this group, F(3, 205) = 3.04, p < .05, that was 
due entirely to the law students having higher scores than 
psychology, chemistry, or medical students. 
This pattern of first-year differences means that the 
cross-sectional results slightly overestimate improvement 
for the (self-selected) third-year Chemistry students, at 
least for statistical-methodological reasoning and verbal 
reasoning. Other than that, the pattern indicates that there 
was little difference among first-year students in either 
s All p values reported are based on two-tailed tests. Means (and 
more detailed summaries) of the data are available upon request from 
the first author. 
design except for a slight advantage for the first-year law 
students in verbal reasoning. 
Changes in Reasoning Scores 
Verbal reasoning. The change scores for verbal reasoning 
for all students, for both the cross-sectional study and the 
longitudinal study, are presented in Figure 1. It may be 
seen that, as anticipated, all groups show slight improve- 
ment in verbal reasoning, ranging from 5% to 17% in the 
cross-sectional design and from 4% to 14% in the longi- 
tudinal design. Only the medical students' improvement 
reaches statistical significance as measured by t test, p < 
.05, for both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal study. 
The interaction between discipline and year fell far short 
of significance. These results provide a base from which 
to examine the differential change for the four groups in 
the other two types of reasoning. 
Statistical-methodological reasoning. It will be re- 
called that statistical and methodological reasoning scores 
could not be differentiated from one another psycho- 
metrically. The two types of scores were also affected in 
the same way by training in the different disciplines. For 
these reasons, the scores for statistical and methodological 
reasoning were combined for purposes of analysis. Change 
scores for all subjects, for both the cross-sectional study 
and the longitudinal study, are presented in Figure 2. It 
may be seen that the psychology students changed dra- 
matically from the first year to the third year in statistical- 
methodological reasoning, t(56) = 5.00, p < .0001 in the 
cross-sectional study, paired-t(23) = 5.37, p < .0001 in 
the longitudinal study. Medical students also changed 
substantially, t(173) = 2.73, p < .01 in the cross-sectional 
study, paired-t(86) = 3.09, p < .005 in the longitudinal 
study. Law students, in contrast, showed no significant 
improvement in statistical-methodological reasoning, 
t(261) < 1 in the cross-sectional study, paired-t(76) = 
1.17, ns, in the longitudinal study. Chemistry students 
also did not improve, ts for both designs < 1. The inter- 
action between year and discipline is significant for both 
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the cross-sectional design, F(3, 552) = 5.33, p < .001, 
and the longitudinal design, F(3, 202) = 5.62, p < .001. 
Conditional reasoning. Figure 3 presents change in 
conditional reasoning for all students, for both the cross- 
sectional and the longitudinal design. The students in law, 
medicine, and psychology all improved in their ability to 
reason about conditional problems. None of the differ- 
ences are significant in the cross-sectional study, but all 
three are significant in the longitudinal study, paired- 
t(76) = 2.9 I, p < .005 for law, paired-t(86) = 3.22, p < 
.002 for medicine, paired-t(23) = 2.29, p < .05 for psy- 
chology. It should also be noted that the trend was for all 
three groups to improve on all four types of questions-- 
arbitrary, causal wording, permission wording, and bi- 
conditional. In contrast, chemistry students did not im- 
prove in conditional reasoning, both ts < I. The inter- 
action between year and discipline fell short of significance 
for both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal design. 
Discussion of Studies 1 and 2 
The results are thus quite consistent with the view that 
reasoning can be taught and that different graduate dis- 
ciplines teach different kinds of reasoning to different de- 
grees. It appears that the probabilistic sciences of psy- 
chology and medicine teach their students to apply sta- 
tistical and methodological rules to both scientific and 
everyday-life problems, whereas the nonprobabilistic sci- 
ence of chemistry and the nonscientific discipline of the 
law do not affect their students in these respects. Psy- 
chology, medicine, and the law all seem to teach their 
students rule systems that increase their ability to reason 
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ditional in logic affords solutions. In our view, this is not 
because these fields teach the rules of formal logic, but 
because they teach pragmatic reasoning schemas that 
provide the same solutions as does the conditional. These 
reasoning schemas include causal schemas and their as- 
sociated evidence-checking procedures, and contractual 
schemas, including the permission and obligation 
schemas. 
The results for the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
designs are similar enough to give us some confidence 
that the results are an accurate reflection of true changes 
produced by training in the various disciplines at the 
University of Michigan. It would increase our confidence 
in the generality of the results, however, to have a repli- 
cation at another institution. This is especially the case 
for the chemistry results, which amount to a null finding 
on a relatively small N base. In order to increase our 
confidence in the findings and to ensure that no features 
peculiar to a Michigan education were important, the 
study was partially replicated at the University of Cali- 
fornia at Los Angeles (UCLA). 
Cross-Sectional Replication: Study 3 
Method 
The method for UCLA was identical in every respect to 
that for the cross-sectional study at the University of 
Michigan, except that only psychology and chemistry 
students were studied and the instrument was shortened 
to delete items having ceiling effects at Michigan. In ad- 
dition, an extra biconditional item was added to the con- 
ditional-reasoning scale on both forms. A very high re- 
sponse rate was obtained. The ns were 27 of 30 first-year 
psychology students (90%), and 27 of 27 still-enrolled 
third-year psychology students (100%), 35 of 37 first-year 
chemistry students (95%), and 28 of 30 still-enrolled third- 
year chemistry students (93%). The drop-out rates were 
lower for chemistry at UCLA (22%) than at Michigan 
(46%). The psychology drop-out rate at UCLA (23%) was 
virtually identical to that for chemistry. 
Results 
Cohort differences. A comparison of combined GRE 
scores for first- and third-year students in the two disci- 
plines showed only very slight differences between chem- 
istry cohorts but a nontrivial difference between psy- 
chology cohorts, t(47) = -1.91, p = .06, with first-year 
students (M = 2,002) scoring higher than third-year stu- 
dents (M = 1902). Because GRE scores are correlated 
with each of the dependent variables, results were sub- 
jected to covariance analyses and adjusted means are re- 
ported. GRE scores were not available for 12 students, 
therefore ns for the covariance analyses are slightly re- 
duced. 
Social science versus natural science differences 
among psychology students. Preliminary analyses re- 
vealed that the magnitudes of training effects for psy- 
chology students were smaller at UCLA than at Michigan. 
Subsequent analyses indicated that differences were en- 
tirely due to the relatively large fraction of "natural sci- 
ence" psychology students at UCLA. Fully 35% of UCLA 
psychology students were in the areas of physiological, 
learning and behavior, or experimental psychology, versus 
only 12% at Michigan. Analyses revealed that these fields 
showed little positive change in reasoning scores, whereas 
the "social science" fields of personality, social, devel- 
opmental, and clinical showed changes fully comparable 
to those observed at Michigan. Results are therefore pre- 
sented separately for social science and natural science 
psychologists. The n for first-year social science psychol- 
ogy students was 17, for third-year social science psy- 
chology students 15, for first-year natural science psy- 
chology students 8, for third-year natural science psy- 
chology students 9, for first-year chemistry students 31, 
and for third-year chemistry students 25. 
Verbal reasoning. Table 1 presents reasoning scores, 
reported as percent correct for each scale, for both social 
science and natural science psychology students, and for 
chemistry students. It may be seen that the pattern for 
verbal reasoning is very similar to that observed in Studies 
1 and 2, that is, all fields of study show slight and non- 
significant improvements from the first year to the third 
year, all ts < 1. The interaction between year and disci- 
pline fell far short of significance. 
Statistical and methodological reasoning. It may be 
seen in Table 1 that the statistical-methodological rea- 
soning of social science psychologists showed substantial 
change, amounting to a 59% improvement over two years 
of study, F( 1, 31) = 11.35, p < .002. In contrast, neither 
the natural science psychologists nor the chemistry stu- 
dents improved. The natural science psychologists ac- 
tually showed a slight but nonsignificant decrease. The 
interaction between year and discipline is highly signifi- 
Table 1 
Adjusted Means for Reasoning Scores for First- and Third-Year UCLA Psychology and Chemistry Students 
Social science Natural science 
psychologists psychologists Chemistry 
Type of reasoning I st year 3rd year I st year 3rd year 1st year 3rd year 
Verbal 51.2 55.6 42.4 45.7 50.4 51.1 
Statistical and methodological 40.5 64.2 47.4 36.1 29.0 33.8 
Conditional 32.7 51.6 53.3 36.1 39.3 31.3 
June 1988 9 American Psychologist 439 
cant, F(2, 104) = 5.61, p < .005. It should be noted that 
the difference between social science and natural science 
psychologists is particularly marked for the questions 
having everyday-life content, interaction F(I, 48) = 9.15, 
p < .005, and is substantially less for questions having 
scientific content, interaction F(I, 48) = 2.84, p = .  10. 
Conditional reasoning. It may be seen in Table 1 
that conditional reasoning for the social science psychol- 
ogists improved substantially over two years of study, F(I, 
31) = 3.93, p --- .06. Conditional reasoning for both nat- 
ural science psychologists and chemistry students actually 
declined, although the decline is not significant in either 
case. The interaction between year and discipline is sig- 
nificant, F(2, 104) = 3.36, p < .05. 
Discussion of Study 3 
The results for the replication study lend support to the 
results, and the interpretation of the results, for Studies 
1 and 2. Change in verbal reasoning is positive and slight 
for all fields. Change in both statistical-methodological 
reasoning and conditional reasoning is positive and pro- 
nounced for social science psychologists and nil or slightly 
negative for chemistry students and natural science psy- 
chologists. The results indicate that the early years of 
training in the probabilistic sciences can be helpful for 
reasoning about certain kinds of problems using partic- 
ular rule systems whereas the early years of natural science 
training have little effect on those same problems and 
rule systems. 
General Discussion 
The results show that training in both psychology and 
medicine can affect statistical reasoning about everyday- 
life problems, methodological reasoning about everyday- 
life problems employing a number of rules related to the 
confounding principle, and reasoning about problems 
that logicians can solve using the material conditional in 
deductive logic. In addition, training in the law affects 
conditional reasoning. Training in chemistry does not 
seem to affect any of these kinds of reasoning. 
Why do we find this pattern of results? Psychologists 
receive statistical training as part of the first two years' 
research experience; thus, the finding that training in 
psychology affects statistical reasoning about everyday- 
life events amounts to an extension of previous results 
by Fong et al. (1986) showing that statistical training af- 
fects thinking about everyday-life events. Most psychol- 
ogists will not be surprised that training in their field also 
affects reasoning about confounded variables in everyday 
life involving methodological principles such as selection 
and the need for control groups. Particularly in the social 
science branches of psychology, day-to-day research ex- 
perience requires students to think about everyday-life 
events of the kind being studied and to employ such 
methodological principles. Although the natural science 
branches of the discipline also teach these rules in a formal 
way, we believe they provide much less experience in ap- 
plying them to everyday-life events. Thus, it would not 
be surprising if further work replicated the results of Study 
3, which showed more improvement for social science 
psychology students than for natural science psychology 
students, especially in working with everyday-life prob- 
lems. (For the time being, however, the reader should be 
warned that this difference was found only at one insti- 
tution and that the n of natural science psychology stu- 
dents was rather small.) 
It may be more surprising to psychologists that 
medical training increases statistical and methodological 
reasoning skills as much as it does. Examination of the 
medical curriculum at the University of Michigan reveals, 
however, that a great deal of training is geared toward 
teaching students how to think about uncertain events. 
For one thing, students are given a pamphlet explaining 
the basics of statistics and are expected to learn its con- 
tents. In addition, they are given original articles to read, 
with their reports of statistical tests, considerations of 
variance, sample size, and so forth. Perhaps more im- 
portant, although most of the course content in the first 
two years is ostensibly focused on the natural sciences, 
there is in fact a continual effort to relate such content 
to complicated everyday medical problems. This attempt 
contains frequent allusions to the difficulties of making 
inferences in medical situations and to the uncertainties 
inherent in medical practice. Students are told of false 
positive and false negative rates for tests and of costs for 
tests, and they are asked whether, for a patient with par- 
ticular presenting symptoms, they would "pay" for a par- 
ticular test to be done. It is also made clear to students 
that the confounded variable principle underlies much 
medical "sleuthing." For example, they are reminded that 
some behaviors, such as cigarette smoking, are likely to 
be associated with others, such as coffee drinking. Thus, 
it is not surprising that two years of medical school affects 
statistical and methodological reasoning about everyday- 
life events. Because such training is also likely to require 
students to think about causal relations of different kinds, 
including those for which the evidence-checking proce- 
dures resemble those for the conditional and those for 
the biconditional, it is also not surprising that medical 
training results in improved ability to solve conditional 
and biconditional problems. Probably for the same rea- 
son, training in psychology results in improved ability to 
solve these problems. 
Training in the law does not stress rules for dealing 
with variability or uncertainty in causal relations, and so 
it is not surprising that it produces no improvement in 
the ability to apply the statistical and methodological rules 
of the probabilistic sciences to either scientific studies or 
everyday-life events. Legal training does provide substan- 
tial instruction and drill in the logic of permissions and 
obligations, which can be used to solve problems in the 
conditional, and it provides additional instruction and 
drill for other contractual relations, particularly those in 
which an action must be taken if and only if some other 
event occurs, which can be used to solve biconditional 
problems. 
In our view, training in chemistry provides no im- 
provement in statistical or methodological reasoning be- 
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cause training in that field, especially in the early years, 
does not deal with events that are probabilistic. Statistics 
is not taught in the first two years of chemistry, and one 
would be hard pressed to come up with examples of con- 
founded-variable rules in the curriculum. Similarly, there 
is little need to differentiate among the various types of 
causal relations because chemistry deals primarily with 
necessary-and-sufficient causes. Moreover, to the extent 
that any statistical or conditional reasoning does occur, 
it would be in field-specific settings highly abstracted from 
the problems of everyday life. The chemistry curriculum 
obviously should not be regarded as deficient, any more 
than a failure to teach about electrical charges should be 
regarded as a deficiency of psychological or legal training. 
However, the luxury of not being confronted with messy 
problems that contain substantial uncertainty and a tan- 
gled web of causes means that chemistry does not teach 
some rules that are relevant to everyday life. 
The present results indicate that 20th century psy- 
chologists have been too quick to conclude that formal 
discipline is not possible and that rule training has little 
generalized educational potential. The results make it 
clear that training of some kinds has substantial effects 
on the way people reason about some sorts of problems. 
The error of psychologists in this century, in our view, 
has been to assume that because some kinds of rule sys- 
tems do not generalize readily from problems having cer- 
tain features to problems having another set of features 
(for example, rules for estimating the area of rectangles 
or rules for solving the Tower of Hanoi problem), all rules 
show equally poor transfer and generalization properties. 
The failure, in other words, amounts to a willingness to 
endorse the null hypothesis on the basis of a limited 
amount of research on a relatively small set of rules. Im- 
portantly, none of the studies that have led to the pessi- 
mistic perspective on the value of formal discipline have 
examined situations in which people learn through im- 
mersion in a field of study and have numerous occasions 
to apply the rules of the discipline to problems that arise 
both inside and outside their course of study. Yet this 
seems to be how disciplinary learning naturally occurs. 
What types of inferential rules can be taught in such 
a way that they will be graceful additions to the rule sys- 
tems that people already use? We think that a major class 
of such rules are those that people have induced, though 
only partially, in the course of their daily existence. Rules 
about assessing causality, rules for generalizing, rules for 
determining argument validity, and rules for assessing 
the probativeness of evidence are the kinds of rules that 
people must have in some measure in order to live effec- 
tively in the world. 
Our work predisposes us to be optimistic about the 
possibility of identifying abstract rule systems underlying 
solutions of real-world problems and about the ability of 
educators to teach these rule systems. This optimism par- 
allels that stemming from recent work by Herrnstein, 
Nickerson, de Sanchez, and Swets (1986) and others (see 
Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 1985, for a review) who 
have shown that strategies of reasoning can be taught to 
elementary school children. These investigators have 
taught such foundations of reasoning as how to use di- 
mensions to analyze and organize similarities and differ- 
ences, how to recognize and extrapolate different types 
of sequences, how to see the structure of simple propo- 
sitions and analyze complex arguments, how to evaluate 
consistency, and so on. Such training not only improves 
performance on IQ tests but also improves the quality of 
open-ended written arguments. 
The truth is that we know very little about reasoning 
and how to teach it. The one thing we thought we knew-- 
namely, that formal discipline is an illusion--seems 
clearly wrong. Just how wrong, and therefore just how 
much we can improve reasoning by instruction, is now 
a completely open question. 
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Appendix A 
Examples of Items Used 
(Correct answers are denoted by i') 
Statistical ReasoningmEveryday Life 
After the first two weeks of the major league baseball 
season, newspapers begin to print the top ten batting av- 
erages. Typically, after two weeks, the leading batter has 
an average of about .450. Yet no batter in major league 
history has ever averaged .450 at the end of a season. Why 
do you think this is? 
i'(a) A player's high average at the beginning of the 
season may be just a lucky fluke. 
(b) A batter who has such a hot streak at the begin- 
ning of the season is under a lot of stress to maintain his 
performance record. Such stress adversely affects his 
playing. 
(c) Pitchers tend to get better over the course of the 
season, as they get more in shape. As pitchers improve, 
they are more likely to strike out batters, so batters' av- 
erages go down. 
(d) When a batter is known to be hitting for a high 
average, pitchers bear down more when they pitch to him. 
(e) When a batter is known to be hitting for a high 
average, he stops getting good pitches to hit. Instead, 
pitchers "play the corners" of the plate because they don't 
mind walking him. 
Methodological ReasoningmEveryday Life 
The city of Middleopolis has had an unpopular police 
chief for a year and a half. He is a political appointee 
who is a crony of the mayor, and he had little previous 
experience in police administration when he was ap- 
pointed. The mayor has recently defended the chief in 
public, announcing that in the time since he took office, 
crime rates decreased by 12%. Which of the following 
pieces of evidence would most deflate the mayor's claim 
that his chief is competent? 
t(a) The crime rates of the two cities closest to Mid- 
dleopolis in location and size have decreased by 18% in 
the same period. 
(b) An independent survey of the citizens of Mid- 
dleopolis shows that 40% more crime is reported by re- 
spondents in the survey than is reported in police records. 
(c) Common sense indicates that there is little a po- 
lice chief can do to lower crime rates. These are for the 
most part due to social and economic conditions beyond 
the control of officials. 
(d) The police chief has been discovered to have 
business contacts with people who are known to be in- 
volved in organized crime. 
Conditional ReasoningmPermission Schema 
You are a public health official at the international airport 
in Manila, capital of the Philippines. Part of your duty 
is to check that every arriving passenger who wishes to 
enter the country (rather than just change planes at the 
airport) has had an inoculation against cholera. Every 
passenger carries a health form. One side of the form 
indicates whether the passenger is entering or in transit, 
and the other side of the form lists the inoculations he or 
she has had in the past six months. Which of the following 
forms would you need to turn over to check? Indicate 
only those forms you would have to check to be sure. 







Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 
(a) Boxes 2 & 3 
(b) Box 2 only 
(c) Boxes 2, 3, & 4 
t(d) Boxes 2 & 4 
(e) Box 3 only 
Verbal Reasoning 
The new miracle drug Amotril has caused unforeseen 
side effects of a devastating nature; therefore, no new 
drugs should be released for public consumption without 
a thorough study of their effects. 
Which of the following arguments most closely re- 
sembles the argument above? 
(a) Because exposure to several hours of television 
a day has been shown to undermine children's interest 
in reading, children should be prevented from watching 
television. 
(b) Because it is difficult to predict whether the re- 
suits of pure research will be of practical benefit to human 
beings, the amount of money spent on such research 
should be sharply curtailed. 
(c) The 1977 model of this compact station wagon 
has been shown to have a faulty exhaust system; therefore, 
it is urgent that this model be recalled immediately. 
t(d) Some of the worst highway accidents have been 
caused by teenagers between the ages of 16 and 18; there- 
fore, only carefully screened members of this age group 
should be granted driver's licenses. 
(e) Rising medical costs have put many routine 
medical procedures out of the reach of low- and middle- 
income families; therefore, doctors should prescribe only 
the most essential laboratory tests. 
442 June 1988 9 American Psychologist 
